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CREATING A CLASSROOM COMPONENT
FOR FIELD PLACEMENT PROGRAMS:
ENHANCING CLINICAL GOALS WITH
FEMINIST PEDAGOGY
Linda Morton*
We would start by learning where the students are, and that
meant teaching as listening rather than teaching as telling. We
had to help ourselves and each other overcome our own assump-
tions about the role of teacher. We had to let go of expecting
teachers to lecture and students to give back to teachers what
they want to hear. It was to be a pedagogy for liberation.'
I. INTRODUCTION
There exists a historic conflict between the more traditional
Langdellian philosophy of legal education,2 and the experiential phi-
losophy of apprenticeship programs, now known as field placement
programs. 3 The conflict is most recently apparent in the American
Bar Association's (ABA) attempts to impose a more traditional
classroom format on field placement programs through its regula-
tions, guidelines, and instructions pertaining to law school accredita-
tion.4 The ABA argues that law schools need to allocate greater in-
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1. Liz Aaronsohn, Learning to Teach for Empowerment 40 RAOicAL TEAcHER 44
(1991) (discussing the author's experiences teaching in Mississippi Freedom Schools
in 1964).
2. The term "Langdellian philosophy" refers to the theory of learning developed
by Dean Langdell of Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century by which
students learn to be lawyers by studying legal principles extracted from appellate
decisions. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s To THE 1980s 52-56 (1983). For a more detailed discussion of Langdell's philos-
ophy, see infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
3. In a memorandum, the American Bar Association (ABA) defines field place-
ment progratms as "internships, externships, judicial clerkships, placement clinics,
and any other program in which actual rendition of legal services or other actual legal
activity are used and in which full-time members of the faculty are not ultimately
responsible for the quality of the service or other activity." Memorandum from James
P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the American Bar Association, to Mem-
bers of Site Evaluation Team 15 (Sept. 1988) (on file with author). California West-
ern School of Law refers to its field placement program as the "Internship Program."
4. See discussion of ABA Standard 306, Interpretation 2 and accompanying in-
structions, infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
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structional resources toward their field placement programs,
particularly programs that provide more than one-half a semester's
credit.5 Such programs should include a classroom component that
meets ABA guidelines.6 Clinical faculty who administer field place-
ment programs argue that such regulations place unnecessary re-
strictions on their programs, 7 show insensitivity toward program
goals of self-learning, and are an ill-disguised attempt to fit field
placement programs into the more traditional models of in-house
and simulation clinics.9
Unfortunately, a traditional Langdellian classroom component is
philosophically inconsistent with self-learning and pragmatic pro-
gram goals. This article proposes a feminist model for field place-
ment classes that helps resolve the conflict between clinic faculty
and the ABA and, more important, enhances the objective of stu-
dents' self-learning.
The model works because of the complementary relationship be-
tween the field placement goal of self-learning and certain principles
of feminist pedagogy. Self-learning means learning how to learn
from experience, or taking responsibility for one's own learning.10
Through self-learning, students develop moral awareness of role
5. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
7. Leah Wortham, American Bar Association Externship Standards: Regulation
in Search of a Theory 8-22 (unpublished, on file with author 1990).
8. Stephen T. Maher, The Praise of Folly: A Defense of Practice Supervision in
Clinical Legal Education, 69 NEB. L. REV. 537, 623-24 (1990).
9. Id. at 623-25. See also Marc Stickgold, Exploring the Invisible Curriculum:
Clinical Field Work in American Law Schools, 19 N.M. L. REV. 287, 319 (1989). In
addition to Maher and Stickgold's extensive critiques of ABA regulations, see Wor-
tham, supra note 7, at 5-22, 34-40.
10. The process of self-learning is aptly described by Professor Kenneth R. Kreil-
ing in his article, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learn-
ing to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40
MD. L. REV. 284 (1981). The concept of experiential learning promoted by field place-
ment programs involves a repeated process of students testing their theories of lawy-
ering against their actions and feedback from others. Theories are revised once stu-
dents observe and reflect upon discrepancies among their own theories, realities they
observe, and feedback from others. In this way, students participate in a continuing
process of testing and revising their understanding of the practice of law according to
their learning experiences. Id. For additional discussions of self-learning, see gener-
ally, JOHN DEWEY, How WE THINK. A RESTATEMENT OF THE RELATION OF REFLECTIVE
THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (1933); MALCOLM KNOWLES, SELF-DIRECTED
LEARNING: A GUIDE FOR LEARNERS AND TEACHERS (1975); DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCAT-
ING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARN-
ING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987).
For further descriptions of self-learning as a goal for field placement programs, see
Maher, supra note 8, at 563-66; Janet Motley, Self-Directed Learning and the Out-
of-House Placement, 19 N.M. L. REV., 211, 219-22 (1989); Stickgold, supra note 9, at
317-18; Wortham, supra note 7, at 24-29.
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identity1 as well as proficiency in the context of law practice.12 To
reinforce self-learning during a field placement, students need a fo-
rum in which they can continually examine and critique their goals,
methods, and lawyer identities."3 Feminist pedagogy emphasizes
contextual reasoning, collaboration, and perpetual questioning; it
provides an ideal environment for student interns to engage in the
self-learning process.1 4 Feminist teaching methodology creates a stu-
dent-facilitated, non-hierarchical atmosphere in which students
learn about the practice of law by sharing their own experiences in
the field and listening to those of others.
Most of the feminist literature pertaining to law school pedagogy
discusses its theoretical basis, or its specific use in Women and the
Law or other non-clinical classes." A recent article by Professor
11. Professor Lawrence Kohlberg describes the enhancement of moral develop-
ment through self-learning and self-reflection. When confronted with an ethical di-
lemma that challenges their personal moral codes, students must reexamine and
sometimes restructure their moral codes in light of each new experience. Through
persistent reexamination, higher development of moral understanding is achieved.
See L. KOHLBERG & E. TURIEL, MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION IN PSY-
CHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTIcE 456 (B. Lesser ed. 1971); see also REsEARCH IN
MORAL D ELoPtMENi. THE CoGrrnvE DEvELOPhMENTAL APPROACH (L. Kohlberg & E.
Turiel eds. 1973). For a discussion of Kohlberg's theories of developmental psychol-
ogy compared with those of other developmental psychologists, see Paul T. Wangerin,
Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal
Education, 62 TuL L. REv. 1237, 1281-1301 (1988).
12. Obviously, self-learning is not the only goal of field placement programs. Co-
rollary goals are those of increasing students' confidence and ability in the workplace
(Stickgold, supra note 9, at 316), allowing students to gain insight into the workings
of the legal system (Motley, supra note 10, at 217-18; Stickgold, supra note 9, at 327;
Henry Rose, Legal Externships: Can They Be Valuable Clinical Experiences for Law
Students?, 12 NovA L. REv. 95, 98 (1987); Wortham, supra note 7, at 27-28), teaching
students professional responsibility (Motley, supra note 10, at 218-19, Stickgold,
supra note 9, at 315; Maher, supra note 8, at 567), and teaching students skills (Mot-
ley, supra note 10, at 214-15; Maher, supra note 8, at 567; Rose, supra at 96-98).
13. "Moral understanding is arrived at by critical reflection on activities that have
been experienced pre-reflectively and begun to be internalized as dispositions. Until
disposition is present, at least in some minimal or beginning form, the moral charac-
ter of action cannot be fully understood. Without the experience of acting in a lawyer
role moral, philosophizing will be just so many words." Robert Condlin, "Tastes
Great, Less Filling". The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 45, 66-67 (1986).
14. For further description of feminist methodology, see infra Part IV.
15. For general descriptions of feminist philosophy and teaching, see, e.g., Patricia
A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 Bma "EY WosmNz's LJ.
191 (1990); Ellen C. DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the
Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L Rzv. 11 (1985); Catharine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield
and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 155 (1988); Christine A. Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10
HARv. WohiN's LJ. 1 (1987); Joyce E. McConnell, A Feminist's Perspective on Lib-
eral Reform of Legal Education, 14 HARv. WONIEN'S L. 77 (1991); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or
"The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 61 (1988); Martha Minow,
19931
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Phyllis Goldfarb begins a valuable application of the feminist model
to law school clinics by describing the similarities of clinical educa-
tion and feminist jurisprudence on a theoretical level.10 Goldfarb re-
jects the artificiality of the theory/practice dichotomy, proposing in-
stead that theory and practice interact as a spiral.17 On a less
abstract level,"' this article will demonstrate the complementary re-
lationship between field placement goals and feminist pedagogy
through a personal account of my use of a feminist teaching ap-
proach in my field placement class.19
To enhance understanding of the apprenticeship/Langdellian con-
flict in law school pedagogy, Part I of this Article discusses the
evolution of the apprenticeship program toward the current field
placement program, illustrating its antithetical stance toward the
more traditional Langdellian form of pedagogy. Part II demon-
Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Deborah L.
Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39 (1988); Ann C. Scales,
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
For descriptions pertaining to specific courses see, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's
Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) (discussing applica-
tion of feminist theory to tort law); Patricia A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal The-
ory at Texas: Listening to Differences and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
165 (1988) (connecting feminist theory and teaching method in a feminist legal theory
class); Mary Irene Coombs, Non-Sexist Teaching Techniques In Substantive Law
Courses, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 507 (1990); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction
of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Ann E. Freedman, Feminist Legal
Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism and Homophobia in Law School, 24
GA. L. REV. 849 (1990) (feminist teaching in a sex discrimination class); Mary Joe
Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM.
U.L. REV. 1065 (1985); Morrison Torrey et al., Teaching Law in a Feminist Manner:
A Commentary From Experience, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 87 (1990) (using feminist
teaching methodology in a feminist jurisprudence class).
16. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991).
17. Goldfarb, supra note 16. To illuminate her spiral theory, Professor Goldfarb
analyzes the reciprocally reinforcing methodologies of clinical education and feminist
jurisprudence.
Professor Goldfarb notes that two other authors, Professor Mark Tushnet and Pro-
fessor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, have commented upon the similarities between
clinical education and feminism, but neither focused specifically on the relationship
of feminist theory to clinical legal education. Id. at 1618, n.75.
18. In line with the feminist theory that the personal is political, I will use the
first person when describing my experiences using feminist pedagogy in the latter half
of this article. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 63, 83; McConnell, supra note
15, at 119-20.
19. In fact, Professor Goldfarb admits that her sweeping synthesis of the theory/
practice spiral within the clinical and feminist movements is too grand in scope to
allow for experiential discussion. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1690 n.382. Inspired by
her wishes that her article be the groundwork for further experiential discussion, I
have written of my own experiences within. In recognizing and speaking from my
experiences, my writing is an attempt to remain true to a feminist methodology.
[Vol. 45:19
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strates how the ABA has recently exacerbated the conflict in its at-
tempts to monitor field placement programs through more tradi-
tional guidelines for law school accreditation. Part m summarizes
efforts by law schools, including California Western, to create a suc-
cessful classroom component that comports with ABA guidelines
and pedagogical goals of field placement programs 20 Part IV out-
lines the major principles of feminist pedagogy and explains in more
detail its commonalities with clinical idealogy. Finally, Part V de-
scribes my own experiences using a feminist format for the intern-
ship seminar class at California Western and analyzes the educa-
tional value of a classroom format based on feminist methodology. I
believe that my experience supports my thesis that the fusion of
feminist pedagogy with field placement experience creates a unique
and valuable educational environment for the training of prospec-
tive professionals.
IL THE EvOLUTION OF FIELD PLACEMENT PROGRAMS AND THEIR
CONFLIcT WITH TRADITIONAL LAW SCHOOL PEDAGOGY
Field placement programs have played a significant role in legal
education for the past two centuries. With their emphasis on contex-
tual learning rather than doctrinal theory, they have been both an
inspiration and a reaction to the more traditional educational
pedagogy instituted by Dean Langdell at Harvard Law School. Yet,
despite their apparent methodological war with Langdellian
pedagogy, field placement programs as we know them today also re-
flect aspects of Langdell's emphasis on institutional training.
Langdell's influence is apparent in such programs' increasing em-
phasis on learning theory and academic rigor. No longer is the objec-
tive of such programs merely to train students in the skills and prac-
tice of law, but more important, to educate students to be "reflective
practitioners" in their cycle of continual self-learning. 2' With the
help of federal funds, there has been increasing involvement by law
school faculty in field placement learning-involvement which in-
cludes more rigorous supervision and more extensive dialogue with
the students.22
20. Regarding California Western's field placement program, this Article confines
itself to the school's development of a classroom component. For a full description
and analysis of the school's program, see Motley, supra note 10.
21. As described by Professors Ian Johnstone and Mary Patricia Treuthart in
their article, Doing the Right Thing: An Ouerview of Teaching Professional Respon-
sibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 75, 79 (1991), "'[r ]efl ective judgment' should be conceived
as a character trait and not merely a skill .... [I]t engages emotional as well as
intellectual faculties .... [It] develops over time and through experience, unlike
character traits such as honesty and courage, which tend to form early in life."
22. I do not mean to assert that Langdell is the sole source of programs' increased
academic rigor. Certainly the concerns for upholding lawyers' professionalism and
morality, fears of malpractice, and an emphasis on the more humanistic aspects of
1993]
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A. The Demise of Apprenticeships: Langdell Institutionalizes
Legal Education
The study of law through training in the field under the tutelage
of practicing lawyers has its roots in the English apprenticeship sys-
tem of legal study. In the first half of the nineteenth century, there
were minimal requirements for the study of law in the United
States. Until the twentieth century, the vast majority of lawyers
were trained in legal principles on the job.2 3 The few fledgling law
schools in existence based their pedagogy in part upon the appren-
ticeship theory, whereby students spent part of each day in law of-
fices under the tutelage of practicing lawyers.2 4
Apprenticeship training rested on the simple theory that placing
students in a law office environment would teach them the necessary
lawyering skills.2 5 Unfortunately, theory and reality diverged. The
law office training was minimal, with little or no supervision, and
had no academic component to reinforce and complement the legal
training.2" In an 1881 ABA report, the dismal apprenticeship experi-
ence is described as follows:
The applicant for admission spends a year or two thumbing Black-
stone or Kent, or both, with now and then a dip into Chitty or
Starkie, in the lonesome, dusty, dreary round of a country attor-
ney's office, where he was left to work his way as best he could with
little to guide him except his common sense (which often was no
guidance at all). He may have asked a few vague questions and
received a few vague answers.27
As a result of the disillusionment with apprenticeship training,
there was a movement to institutionalize the training of lawyers
within an academic setting to raise professional standards and thus
make the bar more competent as well as more exclusive.28 At the
forefront of this movement was Dean Christopher Columbus Lang-
dell, who revolutionized legal study at Harvard Law School by elimi-
nating apprenticeships and creating a two-year program of formal
requirements-a trend soon to be adopted by less prestigious
legal education in the past decade have sparked concern that students' training in the
field involve greater self-reflection and supervision.
23. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 24.
24. Id. at 7-8, 22, 24.
25. See id. at 3, 10 n.5.
26. Id. at 24 ("At its best, apprenticeship at that time was all that clinical legal
education is claimed to be today: close supervision of a student by his principal in
real-life encounters. Yet few apprenticeships worked out that way. Indeed, even when
principals were diligent, the chances of any one office offering a good all-around train-
ing were small.").
27. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 30 n.28 (quoting J.A. Hutchinson, Appendix to the
Report of the Committee on Legal Education, 4 ABA Reports 278 (1881)).
28. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 24-25.
[Vol. 45:19
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schools.2" Rather than emphasizing the realistic elements of law
practice, Langdell emphasized the scientific, doctrinal aspects of
law." He believed legal principles could be extracted through the
study of appellate decisions and then taught to students through
questions and answers, popularized as the Socratic method.3 1 Under
Langdell, law faculty no longer consisted of practitioners, but of in-
dividuals who left the practice of law in order to teach legal
doctrine.3 2
Concerned that the legal profession had reacted too strongly in
eliminating the practical training of lawyers, the ABA passed a reso-
lution in 1921 urging closer contact between law students and prac-
ticing lawyers.33 It was not until the early 1930s, however, that legal
educators vociferously objected to Langdell's changes and made ef-
forts to reestablish apprenticeship programs, as well as other forms
of clinical training, in law schools.34 These members of the legal
community who opposed the Langdellian method as too scientific
and devoid of values founded the Legal Realist movement.35 The
Legal Realists complained that the study of American law failed to
incorporate the role of the social sciences in making legal decisions.
"[L]aw school is needlessly abstract, and needlessly removed from
life." 36
B. Disillusionment with Langdell: The Transition from
Apprenticeships to Field Placement Programs
Concern for immersing students in the more value-laden aspects
of law practice sparked a return to apprenticeship programs. But
law schools, influenced by Langdell's system and no doubt recogniz-
ing the programmatic problems of the past, saw the need for closer
ties between apprenticeships and students' academic training. The
29. Id. at 39, 52.
30. Id. at 52-53.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. at 38-39.
33. Id. at 172.
34. Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 21, at 92 ("Clinical teaching or 'learning
by doing' was acknowledged as an appropriate mechanism for conveying information
about legal ethics as early as the 1930s." (footnote omitted)).
35. Legal realism was a theory of law, popular at the beginning of this century,
which defined law not as an abstract problem of logic, but as a practical question of
social management. Its most famous proponent was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., who believed that lawyers should study the way the legal process functioned in
practice. Legal realists believed that "only by studying the social impact of legal prin-
ciples and rules could men [sic] know whether the law in fact brought about the
administration of real justice." EDwARD A. PURCELL. Ja., THE Cmis or D,ocRA ic
THEORY 74-77 (1973).
36. Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1328 (1947)
(quoting Karl N. Lleweliyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35
COLUAL L Rav. 651, 675 (1935)).
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goals of those who endorsed this training were to educate students
as to the more practical aspects of law and to aid the community,
including the impoverished, in the administration of justice.37
As early as 1928, Professor John Bradway of the University of
Southern California was running a legal clinic very similar to the
current field placement programs.38 Interested students were placed
in the offices of private attorneys, who had accepted cases from the
Los Angeles Public Defender's office." The students worked on the
referred cases under the supervision of their assigned private attor-
ney. Unlike the earlier apprenticeship programs, Bradway's had a
classroom component. One morning a week, the fifteen students en-
rolled in the clinic reported to one another on the progress of their
cases.
40
As Bradway was institutionalizing clinical work at the University
of Southern California, other Legal Realists voiced their support for
students' practical experience outside of the law school. Jerome
Frank emphasized the need for students to "observe carefully what
actually goes on in court-rooms and law-offices."4 Frank suggested
that selected practicing lawyers and faculty work together on in-
structing students in the law.42 In 1935 Karl Llewellyn published a
similar view, suggesting that law schools "deliberately set to work to
plan an interstitial apprenticeship.' 43 LIewellyn later chaired an As-
sociation of American Law Schools (AALS) Committee on Curricu-
lum, which concluded that students must be trained in the practice
of law as well as in the knowledge of the law. 4
During this time a program developed by Professor Walton Ham-
ilton of Yale Law School followed Bradway's earlier lead away from
unsupervised apprenticeships and toward the more carefully
designed and monitored field placement programs as we know them
today. Professor Hamilton supervised seven students placed in gov-
ernment agencies in Washington, D.C., and met with them regularly
for group conferences. He commented that "[tihe program has pro-
37. See John S. Bradway, The Beginning of the Legal Clinic of the University of
Southern California, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 252, 252-53 (1929).
38. At this time, the law schools of Harvard, Yale, Northwestern, Minnesota, and
Cincinnati also had legal clinics. Id. In fact, Northwestern and the University of Min-
nesota required all third year students to participate in the clinic. Id. at 273.
39. Id. at 253-54. The Los Angeles County Public Defender's office referred civil
cases concerning matters over $100 to a panel of about fifty attorneys who agreed to
charge clients based on their ability to pay. Id.
40. Id. at 255-56.
41. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. P .L. REV. 907, 911
(1933).
42. Id. at 920.
43. Llewellyn, supra note 36 at 675-76. "I believe with all my soul in the livening
up, the making real, of theoretical work by practical complement." Id. at 675.
44. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLuM. L. REV.
345, 388 (1945).
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vided an exposure somewhat different from that which the class-
room gives. It develops an awareness and brings out skills which
complement and underwrite those developed in New Haven.""'
But for the next three decades, the role of apprenticeship pro-
grams in legal education was minimal. As law schools developed,
they continued to pattern their teaching on that of the successful
Harvard program."
C. The Establishment of Field Placement Programs in Legal
Education
Field placement programs received a tremendous boost in 1968
when the Ford Foundation funded the Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) with a six million dollar,
five-year grant to support clinical work in law schools.47 The goals of
CLEPR in the promotion of clinical programs were to train students
in basic skills, to expose them to lawyers' "emotional commitments"
to their clients' causes, and to develop students' awareness of socie-
tal injustices."
As a result of the grant, nearly half of the law schools in the coun-
try created clinical studies programs, which provided credit for the
study of practical areas of the law and were taught by clinical
professors.' 9 By 1979, 90 percent of law schools offered clinical train-
ing"0 in at least one of three forms: in-house programs; simulation
classes; or field placement programs.5 1
45. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 230-31 n.98 (quoting "Experiment in Training Stu-
dents by Assignment to Government Agencies, Part ML Report of Walton Hamilton to
the Dean of the Yale Law School," AALS Handbook, 1943, 124).
46. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 191-92.
47. Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19
NVM L REV. 185, 190-91 n.28 (1989); STEVENS, supra note 2, at 230 n.95 (citing Eu-
gene L. Smith, Is Education for Professional Responsibility Possible?, 40 U. CoLO. L
REV. 509, 510 n.8 (1968)). A second source of popularity for clinical education was
students' demands that legal education be more relevant. George S. Grossman,
Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL Enuc. 162, 178-80
(1974). An additional source was the expressed concern for lawyer competency and
the promotion of skills and professional responsibility in law schools. Mark Spiegel.
Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 577, 590-92 (1987).
48. William Pincus, Educational Values in Clinical Experience for Law Stu-
dents, NewsL (Council on Legal Educ. for Professional Responsibility, New York,
N.Y.), Sept. 1969, reprinted in WILLLut PINcus, CLNCAL EDUCATION FOR LAW STU-
DENTS, 77 (1980).
49. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 216. From 1970 to 1976, the number of clinical pro-
grams in law schools expanded from 169 to 494. Id. at 241.
50. Stickgold, supra note 9, at 289 (citing COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION.
1978-1979, at vi (1979)).
51. Stickgold, supra note 9, at 298. Commentary on the virtues and drawbacks of
each model has been ongoing. See, e.g., Motley, supra note 10, at 222-29; Maher,
1993]
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In the past decade, with the dwindling of grant money,52 clinical
legal education has shifted its focus toward student education over
service to the community as a primary goal.53 As more of students'
tuition is applied toward the support of law schools' clinical pro-
grams, schools have taken a closer look at the pedagogical goals and
benefits of clinical training." As a result, by the mid-1980s field
placement programs, which generally cost less than in-house clin-
ics, 55 yet allow students to experience the practicalities of the legal
profession,5 6 had become more popular.5 7
The increasing number of field placement programs in law school
curricula has renewed the conflict between the philosophies of the
Legal Realists and Langdell. Surprisingly, the ABA, once an advo-
cate of the practical training of lawyers, has more recently at-
tempted through its regulations to conform the structure of field
placement programs to that of more traditional legal education.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ABA REGULATIONS ON FIELD PLACEMENT
PROGRAMS
Concomitant with field placement programs' rise in popularity
during the past two decades, the ABA has articulated more detailed
regulations concerning their requirements. Although the ABA
claimed to be concerned with law schools' neglect of their field
supra note 8, at 548-98; Stickgold, supra note 9, at 298-313; Linda F. Smith, The
Judicial Clinic: A Live Laboratory for Law Students, 1 n.4 (October 1990) (unpub-
lished, on file with author).
52. The initial CLEPR grant has been replaced by additional funding sources of
the Department of Health and Human Service's Clinical Education Project (DHHS-
CLEP), the Legal Services Corporation, as well as I.O.L.T.A. and state-funded
sources. Nonetheless, such sources provide funding somewhat erratically and only on
a short-term basis, thus causing criticism by those who wish to see clinical education
more deeply imbedded in legal education. See Jeff Hartje, Report from the Chair,
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. NEWSL. (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Washington, D.C.), (91-2).
53. Kotkin, supra note 47, at 191-93; Maher, supra note 8, at 546-47.
54. Kotkin, supra note 47, at 191-93.
55. Stickgold, supra note 9, at 301, 317. Maher, supra note 8, at 539. Arthur B.
LaFrance, Clinical Education and the Year 2010, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 355 (1987).
For an interesting discussion of the role of cost-benefit analysis in curricular reform,
see John C. Weistart, The Law School Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 1987
DuKE L.J. 317, 334-36.
56. For additional discussion on the benefits of field placement programs, see, e.g.,
Arthur B. LaFrance, Clinical Education: "To Turn Ideals Into Effective Vision," 44
S. CAL. L. REV. 624, 640-43 (1971); Stickgold, supra note 9, at 316-17; Motley, supra
note 10, at 222-24; Condlin, supra note 13, at 63-73.
57. Stickgold, supra note 9, at 294-95. But see Stephen F. Befort, Musings on a
Clinic Report: A Selective Agenda for Clinical Legal Education in the 1990s, 75
MINN. L. REV. 619, 623 (1991). "In spite of many obstacles, live-client clinical educa-
tion is not only alive, but growing." Id. (citing AALS SECTION ON CLINICAL LEOAL
EDUC., FINAL REP. OF THE COMMr~rE ON THE FuTURE OF THE IN-HousE CLINIC (1990).
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placement programs, its solution to alleviate the perceived neglect
was to regulate field placements by imposing upon them more tradi-
tional frameworks of law school teaching.59 The regulations revealed
the ABA's concerns regarding an encroaching law school pedagogy
that was antithetical to Langdell's.6 0
A. The ABA Encourages Stricter Classroom Standards
In 1973 the ABA adopted Standard 306 regarding field placement
programs." Essentially, the regulation requires that credit hours al-
located toward field placement programs be commensurate with the
amount of work performed by the student, that placements be ap-
proved in advance, that students' work be periodically reviewed by
faculty, and that a minimum of 900 hours of credit toward the law
degree comprise regularly scheduled class sessions.0 2
No mention was made, however, of a classroom component until
58. See infra text accompanying note 80.
59. Stickgold, supra note 9, at 319. Stickgold argues that the ABA and the AALS
are trying either to abolish field placement programs or to convert them to an in.
house model Id. at 319. Maher, supra note 8, at 543, makes a similar argument that
the ABA's intervention threatens more harm than good. Both authors contend that it
was law schools' neglect in terms of design and administration of field placement
programs that prompted the ABA's intervention. Id.; Stickgold, supra note 9, at 294.
60. See Maher, supra note 8, at 625 (suggesting that regulators have an uncon-
scious bias favoring the passive learning of the traditional classroom and the teacher-
directed learning of the simulation and in-house clinic).
61. For a detailed historical account of ABA accreditation standards, including
Standard 306, see Maher, supra note 8, at 606-11.
62. ABA Standard 306 states:
If the law school has a program that permits or requires student partici-
pation in studies or activities away from the law school or in a format that
does not involve attendance at regularly scheduled class sessions, the time
spent in such studies or activities may be included as satisfying the resi-
dence and class hours requirements, provided the conditions of this section
are satisfied.
(a) The residence and class hours credit allowed must be commensurate
with the time and effort expended by and the educational benefits to the
participating student.
(b) The studies or activities must be approved in advance, in accordance
with the school's established procedures for curriculum approval and
determination.
(c) Each such study or activity, and the participation of each student
therein, must be conducted or periodically reviewed by a member of the
faculty to insure that in its actual operation it is achieving its educational
objectives and that the credit allowed therefore is, in fact, commensurate
with the time and effort expended by, and the educational benefits to, the
participating student.
(d) At least 900 hours of total time credited towards satisfying the "in resi-
dence" and "class hours" requirements of this Chapter shall be in actual
attendance in regularly scheduled class sections in the law school conferring
the degree, or, in the case of a student receiving credit for studies at an-
other law school, at the law school at which the credit was earned.
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1980, when the AALS and the ABA published guidelines for Clinical
Legal Education. 3 The Guidelines encourage, but do not mandate
"a structure that requires identifying substantive educational objec-
tives; conducting a classroom component; relating fieldwork to sub-
stantive legal issues; faculty responsibility for determining and over-
seeing the accomplishment of the course's substantive objectives;
and faculty responsibility for supervising cooperating attorneys in
fulfilling their teaching responsibilities." '64
The Guidelines were never meant to be standards for accredita-
tion. 5 Nonetheless, they established a precedent for the formulation
of specific standards governing field placement programs.66 More-
over, the ABA's concerns that programs incorporate a classroom
component, that they address the learning of substantive legal is-
sues, and that they fulfill substantive objectives, are an early indica-
tion of the ABA's desire that such programs conform more with
traditional legal education67
B. The ABA Applies the Standards to Law School Accreditation
The first mention of a classroom component pertaining to accredi-
tation standards for field placement programs occurred in 1986,
when the ABA promulgated Interpretation 2 of Standard 306.68 Sec-
tion (e) of Interpretation 2 includes "classroom component" among
ten factors the Accreditation Committee is to consider in evaluating
63. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 9-10 (1973). ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS-AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION COMMITrEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUCATION (1980) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
64. GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 77.
65. "[The Guidelines] are emphatically not intended as standards for purposes of
accreditation or in any other way to force clinical legal education into a particular
mold." Id. at 6.
66. Maher, supra note 8, at 613-15.
67. See supra note 9. This is not to say that the ABA's sole purpose in regulating
field placement programs is to conform them to traditional law school pedagogy. The
ABA's concern is that schools are not devoting appropriate instructional resources
and time to their field placement programs. Even Prof. Gordon Gee, author of several
CLEPR reports, disparaged field placement programs as "education on the cheap."
Council on Legal Educ. for Professional Responsibility, 1979 Report, at xxii, cited in
Stickgold, supra note 9, at 297. The problem rests in the ABA's anachronistic notions
of what constitutes a proper academic component to field placement programs.
68. In 1980, the ABA also published Interpretation 1 of Standard 306(a), which
simply provides that "student participants in a law school externship program may
not receive compensation for a program for which they receive academic credit." Roy
D. Simon, Jr. & Tom Leahy, Clinical Programs That Allow Both Compensation and
Credit: A Model Program for Law Schools, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1015, 1016 (1984).
This article analyzes the ABA's attempts to regulate the field placement classroom.
For an excellent general critique of Interpretation 2, see Maher, supra note 8, at 622-
39; see also Wortham, supra note 7.
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placement programs' compliance with Standard 306.00
Initially, the ABA offered no specifics on the composition of the
classroom component, the weight given to its existence or absence,
or whether such a component was actually required. Although the
vagueness of section (e) allows the ABA more discretion in refusing
to accredit field placement programs, 7 0 such vagueness can also be
viewed as allowing faculty greater academic freedom in program
design.
Yet such freedom has been eroded by more detailed guidelines to
site evaluators. In the three years following the promulgation of In-
terpretation 2, the Consultant on Legal Education for the ABA pro-
vided more specific instructions regarding the classroom component
for use by law school accreditation teams. A September 1988 memo-
randum to members of site evaluation teams from the ABA's Con-
sultant on Legal Education, regarding teams' review of professional
skills programs, indicates areas for review of classroom components
as follows:
Does each placement clinic have regular classroom meetings? Is
there a syllabus for the course? Is it followed? Are there course
materials? Do they relate to the educational goals of the course?
Are they discussed in class? Are they referred to by the students
and field instructors in one-to-one meetings about casework? Do
field instructors participate in classroom instruction? Do they at-
tend? Has the school established written instructions about how
the one-to-one supervision on cases should relate to the rest of the
course?71
The instructions further reveal the ABA's desire to have field
placement programs conform to its notion of appropriate legal edu-
cation-either that of substantive law classes, or, at a minimum,
69. The full text of Standard 306, Interpretation 2 (e) states as follows:
(e) In evaluating whether such a program, in light of the educational
objectives of the program, complies with the requirements of Standard 306,
the Accreditation Committee shall consider the following factors:
" Prerequisite for student participation
o Extent of student participation
o Method of evaluation of student performance
o Qualification and training of field instructors
" Method of evaluation of field instructors
" Classroom component
" Student writings
" Adequacy of instructional resources
" Involvement of full-time faculty
" Amount of academic credit awarded
70. For a critique of section (e)'s vagueness, see Wortham, supra note 7, at 13-14.
71. Memorandum from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
American Bar Association, to Members of Site Evaluation Team 13 (Sept. 1988) (on
file with author).
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that of in-house and simulation clinics. 2 Terms such as "regular
classroom meetings," "a syllabus," and "course materials discussed
in class" all reflect a pedagogical model based upon more traditional
concepts of learning. Concerns that field instructors (meaning super-
vising attorneys, rather than field placement faculty) refer to course
materials in case discussions with students, that they participate in
class discussions, and that the supervision of cases by field instruc-
tors relates to the rest of the course are modeled on in-house and
simulation clinic formats in which the faculty exert greater control
over the students' cases.7
3
In September 1990, the ABA promulgated another set of instruc-
tions for accreditation teams,7 4 with content and concerns reinforc-
ing those propounded in 1988. The language is substantially similar
to that of the earlier instructions. The new language reads:
Describe any classroom component of each program. Are there reg-
ular classroom meetings? Is there a syllabus for the course? Are
there course materials? Has the school established written instruc-
tions about how the one-to-one instruction by the field supervisors
relates to the classroom component of the course?75
The ABA issued new guidelines for site evaluation teams again in
September 1992. Interestingly, the instructions pertaining to the
classroom component revert to the exact language of the September
1988 guidelines, with its more detailed concerns regarding the field
placement class. 8
In May, 1991, the Accreditation Committee of the Section of Le-
gal Education and Admissions to the Bar announced the creation of
a subcommittee to study issues of interpretation and application of
Interpretation 2 of Standard 306(c) concerning full-time field place-
ments.77 The committee focused its concern upon the language ex-
72. See Robert J. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for
Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REv. 223 (1981) (suggesting that
the teaching of in-house clinical teacher and traditional law teacher is very similar).
73. Professor Condlin has critiqued the control exercised by clinical teachers. Id.
at 248-74. Condlin compares the professorial control of the "conventional clinic" with
the more collaborative supervision by field placement faculty and supervising attor-
neys in his article, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic and Political
Critique, supra note 13.
74. Memorandum from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
American Bar Association, to Members of Site Evaluation Team (Sept. 1990) (on file
with author).
75. Id. at 6. For an interesting critique of the series of ABA instructions, see
Maher, supra note 8, at 632-34.
76. Memorandum from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
American Bar Association, to Members of Site Evaluation Team 11 (Sept. 1992) (on
file with author).
77. Memorandum from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
American Bar Association, to Deans of ABA Approved Law Schools (May 23, 1991)
(on file with author).
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pressed by section (e) of Interpretation 2. It seemed most concerned
with the lack of instructional resources, including classroom compo-
nents, applied to full-time field placement programs.
The Committee has reviewed a number of programs in recent years
that involve students' spending all or most of their time during a
semester or quarter with a judge or other agency. The general posi-
tion of the Committee from the above language is that the greater
the number of credits awarded, the greater the level of instruc-
tional resources that the school must devote to the program. The
Committee has expressed its disapproval, in resolutions addressed
to individual schools, of several programs that involved high levels
of credit without classroom components or other intensive involve-
ment of faculty in the placement. The only judicial placements
that the Committee has approved in recent years have involved ei-
ther a classroom component or no more than one-half of a full se-
mester's credit.
78
Failure to devote instructional resources to field placement pro-
grams is certainly a legitimate concern. But regulating the format
for application of such resources counters pedagogical goals of such
programs and is of great concern to faculty administering field
placements.79 The committee's redraft of Interpretation 2 was re-
leased in February, 1993 and is scheduled to go into effect in July,
1993.80
IV. FIELD PLACEMENT PROGRAMS' RESPONSES TO THE ABA
As evidenced by Bradway's and Hamilton's field placement pro-
grams described above, several law schools had a classroom compo-
78. Id. at 1-2.
79. In fact, the ABA's redraft of Interpretation 2 was a topic for discussion at the
AALS Clinical Conference in Albuquerque in May of 1992, and at the January 1993
AALS Conference in San Francisco. Two versions of redrafted regulations were
mailed to law school deans for comments in October, 1992. Several deans criticized
the ABA for their "unwise" trend toward more specific, detailed regulations. See Let-
ter of October 16, 1992 to James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the
American Bar Association, from sixteen law school deans.
80. Unfortunately, the new interpretation regulates field placement programs
even more stringently than its predecessor. Some of the new requirements are that
programs will be evaluated in light of their classroom component, which is required
for any program awarding more than six credits (a contemporaneous class being pre-
ferred); that field placement visitation by faculty is a factor in program evaluation,
and is required for programs awarding more than six credits; that field placements
initiated by students will be "closely scrutinized" by the Accreditation Committee;
and that, every three years, law schools must write an appraisal of programs awarding
more than six units of credit. See Proposed Amendment of Interpretation 2 of Stan-
dard 306 of November 16, 1992, from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education
to the American Bar Association, to Members of the Council of the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar. Moreover, there is no mention of changes in
the existing guidelines for site evaluation teams. If anything, changes in the guide-
lines would have to accommodate the more detailed and stringent regulations.
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nent to their programs before the ABA's promulgation of Interpre-
tation 2. Others did not.81 One reason for this disparity may be, as
the ABA contends, that law schools are simply neglecting their field
placement programs. But another reason may be that some field
placement faculty believe that a classroom component viewed in the
traditional sense contradicts the educational purposes of field
placements.8 2
One of the difficulties for field placement faculty in designing a
classroom component is structuring the class so that it complements
program goals of self-learning.as There is little consensus as to the
structure or content of such classes, as field placement programs are
so varied among schools.' Reading materials used are generally
materials compiled by field placement faculty, rather than text-
books.8 5 In addition, students have traditionally resisted classroom
environments pertaining to their field work, preferring to learn in
the law office, rather than the law school. 8
As a result, schools that have adopted a classroom component are
extremely varied in their approaches, as demonstrated by the survey
results outlined in section A below. The brief chronology of Califor-
nia Western's varying approaches, described in section B, exempli-
fies the struggle to create a format satisfactory to student and
faculty and conducive to self-learning. The description of programs
in both sections will illustrate the perhaps misdirected tendencies of
81. Professor Marc Stickgold conducted a survey in 1982 on externship programs
that revealed that fifty-four out of seventy-nine schools responding to the survey of-
fered a classroom component "'directly related' to the students' fieldwork." See
Stickgold, supra note 9, at 309-10.
82. See supra notes 7-9. Obviously, not all field placement faculty hold this view.
In fact, a majority of programs use a more traditional format of lecture/discussion in
their field placement classrooms. It is questionable, however, whether this format is
widely used because faculty believe it is most appropriate, or because the ABA guide-
lines encourage a more traditional format.
83. Professor Maher argues that the goals of field placement programs may differ
from in-house clinics, justifying a more student-centered approach to the classroom:
The in-house program may have as its principal objective the instruction of
litigation skills with teaching students to accept responsibility being only a
secondary goal. However, the principal objective of the practice supervised
program may be teaching students to accept responsibility with learning
litigation skills being the secondary objective. This shift in emphasis is im-
portent because, while instruction by full-time faculty may be a good way
to teach litigation skills, a student-centered approach may be superior for
learning to accept responsibility.
Maher, supra note 8, at 565.
84. Id. at 600-602. Cf. Motley, supra note 10, at 227 (stating that many schools
have tried classroom components, with varying success). In an attempt to centralize
and share information on various externship programs, Professor Robert Seibel of
Cornell Law School has surveyed law schools about their programs. For preliminary
results of his survey see infra Part III A.
85. Maher, supra note 8, at 601.
86. Motley, supra note 10, at 227.
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field placement programs to comply with ABA regulations by model-
ing their classroom components on more traditional formats.
A. Survey Results Regarding Classroom Components
A recent survey by Professor Robert Seibel of Cornell Law School
reflects the variety of form and content in classroom components.'
In the survey, questionnaires were mailed to all United States mem-
ber and fee-paid law schools listed in the AALS directory of law
schools. Of those questionnaires mailed, sixty-eight schools re-
sponded. Preliminary statistics indicate that fifty-eight schools have
field placement programs. Of those fifty-eight, thirty-five" schools
have a classroom component to their program that meets consist-
ently-at least fourteen hours over the course of a semester or at
least one hour per week. The great majority, thirty-two schools, use
compiled materials for their classroom component, rather than a
printed text, which only three schools use.
The statistics indicate that skills, professional responsibility, stu-
dent reflection, and substantive law are the subjects most often dis-
cussed in field placement classes.89 The formats most prevalent are
lecture and student presentation. Statistics as to content and format
of the classes for forty-four programs are as follows:
Of 44 Programs*
Program Content # of % of
Used programs programs
Substantive Law 16 36.4
Skill 25 56.8
Legal Process 6 13.6
Legal Institution 11 25.0
Professional Resp. 22 50.0
Career Choices 5 11.4
Student Reflection 17 38.6
Other 2 4.5
*Note that most programs only devoted a percentage of the classroom time to a given
area.
87. Professor Seibel has not yet published the results of his survey. Because I
assisted him in developing the survey, he was kind enough to send me copies of all
the responses. We are in the process of developing an extensive national database on
the information we have. The results described in the text following this footnote are
from preliminary drafts by my research assistant, Linda Littlefield (Spring 1992) (on
file with the author).
88. A few schools had more than one program. The total number of programs with
a classroom component is forty-four.
89. Statistics recorded above reflect schools that had a minimum of 20 percent of
the content or format named. In other words, sixteen programs had a minimum of 20
percent substantive law taught in their field placement class. Programs with less than
20 percent substantive law were not included in the statistics for that category. The
survey results as to content of the programs may be a bit skewed, as "student reflec-
tion" is more a method of discussing such topics as professional responsibility and
skills, than an actual topic.
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Of 44 Programs*
# of % of
Format Used programs programs
Lecture/Discussion 31 70.5
Guest Speaker 13 29.5
Student Presentation 20 45.5
Student Facilitated 6 13.6
Simulation 4 9.1
Other 1 2.3
*Note that most programs use at least 2 of these formats.
Most important, the statistics show that the majority of field
placement programs are modeling their classes on a more traditional
form of pedagogy. The topics of skills and substantive law, although
certainly pertinent to field placement experiences,"0 pertain more to
in-house clinics, simulation clinics, and substantive law courses.9 ' In
addition, the format for the classes also imitates that of more tradi-
tional methods, with more formal lectures and student presentations
as the norm, rather than student facilitation.
B. California Western's Earlier Approaches to the Field
Placement Class
To reinforce the goal of self-learning during field placement, stu-
dents must have the opportunity to examine and critique continu-
ally their goals, methods, and lawyer identities.9 2 At California
Western, an emphasis on self-learning begins before students start
their internships. Students meet with clinical faculty to discuss their
learning goals and select their field placements. Throughout the se-
mester, students maintain journals in which they record not only
what they are doing, but what they are learning in terms of skills,
the legal system, and their place within it. They meet individually
with clinical faculty on a regular basis to review and revise their
learning goals in the context of their lawyering experiences. Stu-
dents also meet regularly with their supervising attorneys to discuss
their progress in honing specific skills, as well as their professional
development. Faculty grade them on their ability to analyze, under-
stand, and accept their professional and personal responsibilities.
Students are not graded on their technical proficiency with a certain
task or knowledge of the substantive law. 3
90. Students in a field placement at the Public Defender's office could most likely
benefit from a class on oral advocacy, or a review of the Fourth Amendment. The
problem is that students' placements are often varied and students come to class with
differing levels of skill. See Motley, supra note 10, at 227.
91. See Maher, supra note 8, at 624.
92. See Kreiling, supra note 10, at 289.
93. For a more in-depth discussion of various programs' goals and methods, see,
e.g., Liz R. Cole, Training the Mentor: Improving the Ability of Legal Experts to
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In hope of further enhancing the concept of self-learning, the in-
ternship faculty at California Western has tried to use the classroom
component to complement other aspects of the course. Since I
joined the faculty in 1989, we have tried a variety of formats for
our internship class, all of which met with only marginal success.
Students came reluctantly to class, rarely having read the prepared
materials and, as a consequence, could participate in only lackluster
discussions.
Class formats varied each trimester. They ranged from lecture/
discussions, to student presentations, to skills training, but none
seemed to spark the students' interests. To emphasize the impor-
tance of the class, we added an additional unit of credit in the
spring of 1990, and we increased the number of class meetings from
four to fourteen. Thinking we were doing students a favor, we in-
stead caused a backlash, which discouraged us further. Students
viewed the revamped class as exacerbating existing problems. They
complained that their time would be better spent in the field, and
that the readings were too long, too theoretical and, for the most
part, too depressing.es
At that point we realized that, in attempting rigid control of the
classroom through lecture, discussion, or presentation on materials
we had selected, we had lost sight of our goal. In order to reinforce
self-learning, we needed to focus more on students' learning through
their field placements. In the fall of 1990, we changed our readings
to emphasize the experiences of lawyers and eliminated many of the
more negative law review articles. We decreased the size of the class
from more than twenty to fewer than fifteen students. Students
Teach Students and New Lawyers, 19 NML L. REv. 163 (1989); Maher, supra note 8;
Motley; supra note 10; Rose, supra note 12; Smith supra note 51; Stickgold, supra
note 9; Wortham, supra note 7.
94. By "we," I am referring to the clinic faculty at California Western, which con-
sists of Professors Janet Weinstein (formerly Janet Motley), Irwin Miller, Mark
Weinstein, and the Author.
Although I regret having to use the unfeminist we/they dichotomy in my reference
to faculty and students at California Western, our efforts to structure the classroom
component were perhaps less collaborative than they should have been. Although the
faculty consistently asked for feedback from students, it was the faculty who ulti-
mately declared what the class format and content was to be. Hence, based on what I
now consider to be the self-conscious traditionalism of our methodology, it seems
more honest to discuss our role in terms of "we" and "they."
95. The great majority of our readings were rather lengthy law review articles
written by those disillusioned with the legal profession. Because a lot of the articles
were theoretical, rather than anecdotal, students complained that they were not prac-
tical enough for their purposes. Students also objected that the majority of the arti-
cles covered the emotional hazards of the legal profession, rather than the benefits.
We attempted to explain to them that their job as students was to critique the opin-
ions expressed, not to necessarily incorporate them. Nonetheless, the students were
correct on this point. It is a painful task to read consistently about the negative side
of a profession that one has devoted a great deal of time and money to enter.
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presented topics relating to their field experiences or the class read-
ings. Faculty helped to facilitate the discussions and graded stu-
dents on the quality and thoughtfulness of their presentations.
As a result of these changes, students' attitudes toward the field
placement class improved. Their interest increased with their partic-
ipation and sense of empowerment. But the class still seemed to
have a formality, even rigidity, which appeared to impede, rather
than to enhance, self-learning. After reading in the Harvard
Women's Law Journal a description of a feminist teaching method-
'ology by Professor Morrison Torrey and students Jackie Casey and
Karin Olson,96 I realized our shortcoming had been in not fusing our
content with the process of the class.
The format for our class was still based upon the artificial dichot-
omies between professor and student. The unwarranted control and
power emanating merely from my presence as classroom professor
hindered students' learning from each others' experiences.9 7 Stu-
dents gave their presentations to me, instead of to their peers. They
looked at me as they made their comments, hoping that what they
were saying was in line with my thinking. By their third year, stu-
dents were accustomed to focusing on the words of their professors.
Emphasis in more traditional classes had been on legal principles,
rather than on personal experiences and values. Thus, students had
difficulty with the concepts of self-learning and self-reflection. It be-
came clear that we had to create a completely different power struc-
ture in the classroom, a structure that valued the mutual and coop-
erative exchange of experiences, that promoted the honest
expression of values, and that avoided the pressures of professorial
evaluation.
Inspired by Professor Torrey's account of her success in teaching
a seminar based on feminist methodology, in the spring of 1991 we
began using a feminist format in our internship classes. Despite ini-
tial skepticism, students' evaluations of this format have been over-
whelmingly positive. But to understand how we adopted feminist
methodology, and why it works so well, requires an explanation of
feminist teaching principles.
V. FEMINIST TEACHING METHODOLOGY
Although the feminist movement has historical roots, it gathered
96. Torrey et al., supra note 15 (discusses the experiences of the authors as pro-
fessor and students in a seminar on feminist jurisprudence offered at DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law in the spring of 1989).
97. For a critique of the hierarchical professor/student relationship causing stu-
dents to ultimately internalize such abuse of power as an appropriate model for pro-
fessional conduct, see Toni Pickard, Experience as Teacher: Discovering the Politics
of Law Teaching, 33 U. TORoNTo L.J. 279, 283-90 (1983).
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momentum in law schools in the 1960s,11 at the same time the
clinical movement was gaining momentum, and again in the 1980s.0
Nevertheless, it was in the latter decade that feminist jurisprudence,
as well as teaching methodology, gained a strong foothold in legal
education. 100
Similar to the clinical movement, the feminist jurisprudence of
the 1980s borrowed principles from the Legal Realists 0 1 and Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) proponents, known informally as "crits," who
opposed the abstraction and hierarchy of the Harvard method.
102
Feminist jurisprudence gathered additional support in 1985 when
theorists sponsored a feminist CLS conference. Participants in the
conference differentiated themselves from CLS theorists by specify-
ing feminist theories and methods of confronting law and legal insti-
tutions. "Fem-crits" saw their methods as more "inclusive, par-
ticipatory, nurturing, [and] experience-based" than those fostered
by the CLS movement.103
Feminist teaching goals are to encourage trust and collaboration
among students through conversation and shared experiences, rather
than to emphasize competition and individual achievement, aspects
98. For a brief history of the feminist movement, see Bender, supra note 15, at
12-15. For a more in-depth analysis of the feminist movements, see JEAN E FinDmAN
& WILLms G. SHADE, OUR AmmcAN SisTE. WOMEN IN AamEcAN Lu AND
THOUGHT (2d ed. 1982); NANCY WOLOCH, WohIN AND THE ALMECAn ExPERIENCE
(1984).
Of course, it should be noted that, as Professor Bender argues, feminism's begin-
nings are undocumented because men, not women, recorded human struggles. "Femi-
nism has been in the hearts and minds of at least some women in all time of patri-
archy." Bender, supra note 15, at 12.
99. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 63 & n.10.
100. Although feminist pedagogy in law schools no doubt existed prior to this dec-
ade, it was during the 1980s that writings on feminist jurisprudence, many of which
discuss feminist teaching methodology, began to flourish. See supra note 15. But c.f.,
West, supra note 15, at 4 (arguing that feminist jurisprudence cannot exist until the
patriarchy is abolished).
Also during this time, others wrote of feminist teaching outside the law school. See,
e.g., GENDERED SujEcWm THE DYNAsics OF FEMiNIST TEACHING (Margo Culley &
Catherine Portuges eds. 1985); LEARNING OUR WAY: ESSAYS IN F"Ns'T EDUCAoN
(Charlotte Bunch & Sandra Pollack eds. 1983); MARY FIELD BELENKY Er AL, WomEN's
WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPiENT OF SELF. VOIC., AND MIND (1986); HrsR
EISENSTEIN, CoNTEMPORARY FEMINIST THOUGHT (1983).
101. See Scales, supra note 15, at 1400-1403 (differentiating Feminists from
Realists).
102. CLS is recognized as a school of thought similar to feminist theory in that it
focuses on "the hierarchy, passivity, depersonalization, and decontextualization of
present-day legal education." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 61. Examples of
critical legal theorists' support for clinical education can be found in Mark G. Kel-
man, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 299-300 (1984); Karl E. Klare, The Low-School
Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 343 (1982).
103. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 65. For an additional feminist critique of
the CLS movement, see Hantzis, supra note 15.
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of the case method and Socratic form of teaching.10 4 Feminists have
described this teaching methodology in varying terms. 10 Precisely
what it is remains an open question; °1 feminist teaching "avoids the
confines of a single disciplinary approach."' 0 7 Even the principles
themselves are not distinct concepts, but coalesce.108
For organizational purposes, I have synthesized feminist pedagogy
into the following two principles of content and form: (1) a content
of contextual reasoning through consciousness-raising and perpetual
questioning, and (2) a format of interdisciplinary learning through
collaboration and rejection of artificial dichotomies. These principles
are not necessarily unique to feminist philosophy, nor would all fem-
inists endorse each of the principles I describe. Feminists differ
104. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 81. Obviously, trust and collaboration can
be aspects of the Socratic format, just as competition and individual achievement can
be a part of feminist pedagogy. My differentiation here is not to create artificial di-
chotomies based upon more-valued and less-valued teaching, but only to comment
upon what has been viewed as the dominant characteristics of each. Combining ele-
ments of the different forms of pedagogy, such as feminist and Langdellian, could
very likely enhance legal education. For various critiques of the Socratic system, see
Hantzis, supra note 15, at 156-57; Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with
the Case Method, 36 VI,. L. REV. 517 (1991); Janet Rifkin, Teaching Mediation: A
Feminist Perspective on the Study of Law at 96, 100 in GENDERED SUBJECTS: TuE
DYNAMICS OF FEMINIST TEACHING, supra note 100; Pickard, supra note 95, at 289-90
(criticizing the hierarchical model as fostering the view that professors' conduct to-
ward students can become an inappropriate model for students' conduct toward their
clients); see also a series of articles by McAninch, Brest, Menkel-Meadow, Neu-
stadter, Hegland, and Riskin narrating their personal experiences replacing the au-
thoritarian role in the classroom with a more personalized and less polarized role in
SYMPOSIUM, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, Columbia University School of Law
(1981).
105. In fact, some use the more gender-neutral label of "humanist," rather than
"feminist," perhaps because they do not identify with feminists' claim that their phi-
losophy and teaching methodology stems from their experiences as women in a soci-
ety dominated by men. Illustrating this disparity in terminology are essays in a mon-
ograph entitled HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, supra note 104. All but one of the
essays are by men who use the term "humanist." The sole female author, Professor
Menkel-Meadow, uses the term "feminist" to describe herself. Others have written of
the need to explore the values and emotions that underlie our legal system from a
humanist, rather than a feminist perspective. See, e.g., Jack Himmelstein, Reassess-
ing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psy-
chology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1978); Paul J. Spiegelman,
Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic
of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. OF LEGAL EDUC, 243-70 (1988);
ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEOAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
Because I believe that the essence of the form of teaching I describe draws primar-
ily upon my female experiences of consciousness-raising, rejecting abstraction and hi-
erarchy, and questioning our patriarchal ideology, I choose to use the term "feminist"
rather than "humanist."
106. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 76.
107. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1625.
108. See Torrey et al., supra note 15, at 118.
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among themselves as to certain tenets of feminist thought,100 often
resulting in their ascribing varying labels to their viewpoints, such as
"cultural feminism," "radical feminism," "liberal feminism" and
"postmodern feminism." Feminists who do subscribe to the princi-
ples I discuss have used different terminology or a different concep-
tual structure.11 0
My description of feminist methodology is an attempt to incorpo-
rate writings of women on the subject with my own teaching exper-
iences, not an effort to define feminist pedagogy, nor confine it to
specific terms. Thus, I espouse the belief held by some feminists in
the value of difference, of multiple perspectives, and of collaborative
thought.
A. The Content: Contextual Reasoning Through Consciousness-
Raising and Perpetual Questioning
Contextual reasoning is the development of theory by examining
109. For example, feminist writers disagree over propounding a feminist ethic of
caring and conciliation. Certain feminists support these principles as representing
women's "voice," urging that this voice must be used to reconstruct our rule-based
system created by men. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan's foundational work, IN A DwFEramr
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 29, 64 (1982); see also,
Bender, supra note 15, at 28-32; DuBois, et al., supra note 15, at 54-57 (comments by
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow). Other feminists have argued that the ethic of caring and
conciliation stems from women's experiences of oppression and powerlessness, and
that incorporation of these principles by a patriarchal society would only continue
women's suppression. See, e.g., DuBois, et al., supra note 15, at 21-26, 73-75 (com-
ments by Catherine A. MacKinnon); Scales, supra note 15, at 1380-84. See also,
Naomi 1. Calm, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARv. WoMEN's LJ. 1 (1991) (argu-
ing that feminist litigation need not include an ethic of care). For more recent discus-
sions on this topic, see Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can
We Claim "A Different Voice?" 15 HARv. Wont LJ. 37, 58-64 (critiquing the con-
servative view that Gilligan's work validates a static, universal definition of gender
differences, and urging a more progressive view, that the definition of gender differ-
ences is context-based, and thus more inclusive of women of color, non-middle class,
non-Western, or aged women).
Another disagreement is expressed by African-American women, who argue that
many of the generalizations concerning "women" that feminists espouse, are not ap-
plicable to the experiences of African-American women. See, e.g., Kimberle Cren-
shaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
Cim. LEGAL F. 139, 154; bell hooks, AIN'T I A WowN: BLACK WoMEN AND Fkmaisms 7
(1981). In ignoring differences of class and race among women, feminist theory has
fragmented women. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal The-
ory, 42 STAN. L REv. 581, 585, 592 (1990). See generally, Judy Scales-Trent, Black
Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HAv.
CR-Cl. L REv. 9, 39 (1989).
110. For example, Professor Goldfarb's descriptions of story-as-method may also
be viewed as a form of consciousness-raising. See Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1630-34.
Her delineations of exclusion questions and epistemological questions may come
under Professor Torrey's umbrella of perpetual questioning. See Goldfarb, id. at
1634-36, 1642-46; Torrey et al., supra note 15, at 118.
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human experiences within the context of their surrounding circum-
stances. It is based upon the tenet that theory is generated from
experience, not the reverse.21 Feminists argue that the historical,
political, and social struggles that form the context of a particular
case, are critical to the understanding of the case. They emphasize
the experiential, human, value-oriented dimension of learning the
law."22 Feminist writers have criticized overuse of appellate cases to
teach legal doctrine.21 3 Instead, they attempt to contextualize legal
theory by, for example, bringing to class persons involved in an
ongoing lawsuit to discuss their experiences with the law,"' or
teaching through simulation." 5 Feminist teachers might also teach
classes through cases they have worked on as practitioners." 0 They
might use varied teaching sources, including legislative histories,
data, and other legal documents, in addition to the edited case
text."
1
Consciousness-raising and perpetual questioning are methods to
achieve contextual reasoning. Consciousness-raising has been labeled
the "preeminent method" of the feminist movement ."8 Through the
telling of life events, participants explore common experiences and
emerging patterns, thus building knowledge. 29 Consciousness-rais-
111. See Bender, supra note 15, at 27.
112. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 80-81.
113. Id. at 67-68, 80.
114. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 80 (describing MacKinnon's teaching
First Amendment restrictions on pornography by having actual victims of pornogra-
phy discuss their experiences with students in the classroom).
115. See, e.g., Rifkin, supra note 104, at 102. Professor Rifkin compares her medi-
ation simulation to the casebook method as follows:
In traditional law pedagogy, the case-book is the emblem of the authorita-
tive character of the law, and the 'Socratic method' mirrors and reinforces
the structures of authority. The simulation embodies a contrasting way of
thinking about conflict. The demonstrated mediation illustrates that con-
flict-resolution can be non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian, participatory
and consensual.
Id.
116. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 80. Certain authors delineate "rejec-
tion of abstraction" as a separate principle. See, e.g., Torrey et al., supra note 15, at
117. I tend to view rejection of abstraction, however, as the negative of contextualized
experience. Essentially, feminists reject the objective characterization of jurispru-
dence, claiming that it comprises generalized rules that are subject to context, feel-
ings, and needs. Objectifying the law only reinforces the pretense that law is neutral,
when in fact it is based upon the male norm, created by the patriarchy, and therefore
reflects the male hegemony. Id. See also, Scales, supra note 15, at 1378-79.
117. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 80-81.
118. See Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1626. See also, Torrey et al., supra note 15,
at ill.
119. See Bender, supra note 15, at 9. Professor Goldfarb describes consciousness-
raising as a "collective, interpersonal, reflective method aimed at articulating and ad-
vancing authentic ways of understanding and interpreting lived experiences." Gold-
farb, supra note 16, at 1627 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 15, at 101).
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ing is not simply a matter of stating one's thoughts, "but of discov-
ering one's thoughts with the support and assistance of the other
participants' tentative reports and statements."'' 0 Consciousness-
raising gives authority to individuals' experiences by testing them
against the experiences of others in the group.121 Because the
method places a premium on personal experience, it allows women
and other silenced minorities to have a voice.22
Through constant questioning of male societal norms, feminists
hope to discover and undermine the underlying values and assump-
tions that dominate our interactions. 123 In examining and critiquing
these underlying values, we gain further insight into the power of
such norms. " '
B. The Format: Interdisciplinary Learning Through
Collaboration and Rejection of Artificial Dichotomies
Certain feminists find a multiplicity of perspectives desirable.2 8
Therefore their methodology encourages cross-disciplinary thinking
and rejects artificial doctrinal boundaries. 2 0
They believe preservation of relationships based upon an ethic of
care to be a critical aspect of the female voice.12 7 Collaboration and
destruction of artificial boundaries foster a more open discussion of
the ways in which legal problems can be solved. 28 Collaborative
teaching includes the notion of shared leadership and consensus de-
cision-making in the classroom, rather than professorial domina-
tion.12 9 Students and professor work together to gain knowledge,
rather than students competing with each other or with the profes-
sor to gain advantage over other participants.
Student/professor is one of the artificial dichotomies disparaged.
Other examples are male/female, rational/emotional, and theory/
practice. From these false dualities arises the inference that the "fe-
male" aspect of each dichotomy (here, "female," "emotional," and
120. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1628.
121. See Torrey et aL, supra note 15, at 111-13.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 118.
124. See Minow, supra note 15, at 59-60; Bender, supra note 15, at 4; Goldfarb,
supra note 16, at 1642-46 (describing this process in terms of asking "epistemological
and ethical questions").
125. See Bender, supra note 15, at 11. But cf., Scales, supra note 15, at 1385
(arguing that the male perspective-rights-based society-and the female perspec-
tive--care-based society-are incompatible).
126. See Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1625.
127. See GILuoGAN, supra note 108, at 171.
128. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 81.
129. Id. at 79-80. Obviously, collaborative learning is not confined to feminist
teaching or clinical legal education. See, e.g., Thomas hUchael McDonnell, Joining
Hands and Smarts: Teaching Manual Legal Research Through Collaborative Learn-
ing Groups, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 363 (1990).
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"practice"), is inferior.13 0 Feminists who laud these principles of care
and collaboration believe society should be organized in terms of its
relationships, rather than its differences.1 31 They prize openness, in-
clusivity, and equal respect, rather than hierarchy and exclusivity.3 2
C. The Common Bonds Between Clinicians and Feminists
Both the clinical and feminist movements were reactions to the
more abstract Langdellian form of teaching. Both movements were
instigated by those "outside" the accepted mode of law school in-
struction-practitioners and women. s33 As a result, commonalities
exist between clinical and feminist philosophies, though the move-
ments developed parallel to, rather than in conjunction with, one
another.14
Both clinicians and feminists emphasize interdisciplinary learning
in the context of experience; clinicians learning from lawyering ex-
periences outside the law school and feminists from their exper-
iences as women in a male-dominated society."' Both groups em-
phasize the development of a moral awareness of societal injustices
being a goal of the CLEPR grant as well as an impetus for the femi-
nist movement."' And both movements, in their rejection of the
more competitive and authoritarian Socratic system, emphasize
learning through collaboration and critical inquiry. Of the variety of
clinical programs, field placement programs, with their emphasis on
self-learning and reflective critique, rather than the learning of tech-
nical skills and professorial critique, most closely mirror and com-
plement the feminist process.
VI. USING FEMINIST METHODOLOGY IN THE FIELD PLACEMENT
CLASS: WHAT WE Do AND WHY IT WORKS
Unknowingly, in our effort to structure a classroom component at
California Western in the fall of 1990, we had already fused our
clinical goals with certain feminist principles. We had emphasized
contextual reasoning through consciousness-raising by having the
130. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 71-75.
131. See Torrey et al., supra note 15, at 115-16.
132. Bender, supra note 15, at 11.
133. Professor Goldfarb also emphasizes the significance of clinical educators and
feminists both having the status of "outsiders," or those outside the more traditional
"male" law school mainstream. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1618-25, citing Mark V.
Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective on the
Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272 (1984).
134. See Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1674.
135. Professor Goldfarb argues that clinicians could focus more on the multiplic-
ity of perspectives feminists emphasize. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1677 n.332.
136. "Feminism brings law back to its purpose-to decide the moral crux of the
matter in real human situations." Scales, supra note 15, at 1387. "[Feminists] place
caring and responsibility over rights and property." Bender, supra note 15, at 11-12,
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class focus on students' internship experiences, so we built on theo-
ries of lawyering processes from the context of those experiences.
We had also emphasized perpetual questioning by having students
continue to examine their experiences and encouraging all to ques-
tion one another, as well as themselves, as to what they were learn-
ing. What we were missing was the format of a more collaborative
environment to enhance the honest discussion of values and
experiences.
A. What We Did
1. Our Goals
In view of our prior mistakes, our goal for the spring of 1991 was
to structure a classroom environment that encouraged students to
share internship experiences and thoughts on practicing law. We
hoped the classroom would be another forum, in addition to our re-
quirements of journal-writings and private meetings between stu-
dents and faculty, which would enhance our goal of student self-
learning. We wanted to encourage cooperation and mutual learning,
rather than competition among students. We wanted students to ex-
perience their innate ability to educate as well as learn from their
peers. But to do so, we needed to create a more conducive atmo-
sphere in the classroom through shared leadership, destroying artifi-
cial boundaries between professor and student, and emphasizing
consensus over dictate.
137
2. Our Methods
To maintain our shift toward a more feminist environment, we
continued to limit the class size to fewer than fifteen students and to
keep the readings focused on personal experiences of individual law-
yers. Borrowing from Professor Torrey, we changed three key com-
ponents, which radically altered the professor/student hierarchy,
and thus the classroom atmosphere.
First, to promote leadership sharing, we changed the label from
student "presenter" to student "facilitator." Students are no longer
required to "present" or impart knowledge to the class, to be ulti-
mately judged in terms of professorial grade. Instead, they are asked
137. Professor Torrey describes the basic ground rules of a feminist environment
as "an atmosphere that valued shared leadership, personal experience, multiple per-
spectives, voluntary participation, continual questioning of power relations, the de-
struction of artificial barriers, decision-making by consensus concerning issues of
common interest, and an understanding of the relationship between self and others."
Torrey et al., supra note 15, at 93.
Consensus decision-making is based upon the concept of "'feeling or sensing to-
gether,' implying not agreement, necessarily, but a 'crossing of the barrier between
ego and ego,' bridging private and shared experience." MARY FEzw BELENKY, et al,
supra note 100, at 223 (quoting literature teacher Norman Holland).
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to "facilitate" a discussion on a topic of their choice. Students are
motivated to lead an interactive and qualitative discussion by their
desire to please the class, not the professor, since they are not
graded on their class facilitation skills. In essence, students are in-
spired to do well merely by their own leadership roles. My trust in
their sense of obligation and interest, and the trust of their peers
provide a positive incentive to cooperate, rather than a negative in-
centive to compete with one another. As a result, a certain degree of
stress, inherent in more traditional law school classes, is allevi-
ated. 138 Furthermore, in order to encourage risking personal com-
ments on difficult issues, I do not grade participants on the quality
or the quantity of their comments in class. 39
The student facilitator begins the class, develops the discussion,
and concludes the class.14 0 The topic may stem from the readings,
the student intern's experiences, or, ideally, an integration of the
two. The topic may simply be in the form of a question, such as how
to deal with a supervising attorney who is not readily available, or it
may be an inquiry as to how others' internships have influenced
their career intentions positively and negatively. It may be objective,
such as a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
mandatory pro bono or the self-policing nature of the profession,
although discussion of students' personal views on the issue and how
138. See B.A. Glessner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L. REv.
627 (1991).
Sharing control with students eliminates significant stressors by reducing
feelings of powerlessness and paranoia. Academics have debated the merits
of a cooperative versus a control model of lawyer-client relationships; a par-
allel choice exists in the model of teacher-student relationships within the
law school. In either context, cooperative relationships are not inconsistent
with challenge or effectiveness, they only require a surrender of some con-
trol and an increase in open communication.
Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
139. See Pickard, supra note 97, at 303-304 (discussing the importance of the pro-
fessor abstaining from evaluating class discussion to promote shared responsibility for
learning and risk-taking on difficult issues).
I do grade students on their class attendance (they may miss one out of fourteen
classes) and on their promptness to class. The purpose of these grades is not to wield
authority, but to encourage self-respect among participants, demonstrating the value
of their presence and input, and to encourage respect for others facilitating. Students
also receive grades on their journals and their timely submission of paperwork re-
quired for private meetings with faculty. To encourage the integration of students'
experiences in the field with those in class, we require students to write about tho
readings assigned for class and the class discussion in their journals. The very few
students who have been reluctant to participate in class discussion have agreed to
discuss the class more extensively in their journals.
140. In order to ease the students' concerns regarding facilitation, I pass out a
sheet the first day explaining the tasks of a facilitator, i.e., asking for announcements,
clearing up any housekeeping details, and posing issues for discussion. Students may
amend the agenda in any way they choose, though initially, they seem to be com-
forted by an outline of a potential agenda.
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their internship experience has influenced their views inevitably
results.
To weaken the student/professor dichotomy, the second altered
component was the change in the role of the clinical faculty member
from professor to peer. On the first day of class I announce that I
prefer to be called by my first name and that I will participate in,
but not steer, the discussion. I tell them that my comments will con-
cern my own experiences or views regarding an issue and that they
will not be an evaluation of others' comments. I also tell them it is
up to the student facilitator to begin and end the class on time. I
explain that my only role is to appear in class on time and comment
on an issue when motivated; should the discussion become too lively,
so that the facilitator must call on participants in turn, my raised
hand is not to be given priority. I warn them that if the discussion
becomes unfocused or irrelevant, it is up to the students to save the
hour from being wasted, according to their definition, not mine. To
encourage the peer relationship, we sit in a circle.
A third change to comport with the feminist teaching methodol-
ogy is that decisions are reached by consensus, rather than by auto-
cratic or majority rule. This is not a dominant component to the
class, as many of the structural components of the field placement
course have already been implemented by clinic faculty.M The con-
sensus process has been used, for example, to decide the content and
time of future classes.
B. Students' Responses to What We Did
Students' favorable responses to the class throughout the course
of the seminar and in their final written evaluations proved we had
arrived at a format which provided a sound structure for our class-
room component.142
The first time I used a feminist teaching methodology to teach the
class in the spring of 1991, nineteen out of twenty students filled out
class evaluation forms I had composed. In response to how they felt
about student facilitation of the class, only one student responded
negatively, stating that some of the leading appeared perfunctory.
Examples of positive comments, as expressed in the student evalua-
tions, were: "felt more open and free thinking, less worried about
141. As stated supra Part IV.B., faculty design, rather than student design, of the
regulations pertaining to internship requirements is antithetical to feminist
philosophy.
142. We continue to hold three private meetings with each student during the
course of her internship. These meetings are for the students to bring up issues relat-
ing to their field placements which they may feel awkward raising in the large group.
They also give the clinic faculty an opportunity to challenge students on an individ-
ual basis as to the quality of their learning and help guide them to be more reflective
of their internship experiences.
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being called upon," "everyone seems to take it seriously," "worked
out wonderfully," "nice change from pre-planned law school classes
where students have no control over agenda," "got a different point
of view each time," "heightens the 'experience' of the internship,"
"became more acutely aware/more sensitive to everything around
me when trying to come up with a topic," "loved leading the discus-
sion," and "best part of group-having such individualized topics
turned into group discussions."
In response to a question on the evaluation form pertaining to the
professor playing the role of peer participant, only four students
commented that it did not always work because the professor still
evaluated and graded students on their participation. Actually,
these students misunderstood our grading procedure.1 43 Some com-
ments of a positive nature were that this method: "[was a] welcome
change," "worked out very well," "helped alleviate anxiety in ex-
pressing opinions," "worked in that after a couple of meetings we
didn't look to professor each time we answered a question," "felt
like a big group of friends most of the time," "[was] terrific," and "I
liked Prof playing peer participant; not often student gets to know
Prof on this level."
Of the eighteen responses to the same questions by the fall of
1991 class, only one student made a negative comment that, except
for the student's own facilitating experience, the students were not
able to control the class. Two other students also commented that
the notion of professor as peer may be illusory. Some of the more
positive comments were: "an open and validating experience where I
felt free to share what was going on in my internship," "I was able
to relate to [the professor] on a more human level because I felt we
were equals," "the small size of the class, as well as the non-hierar-
chical structure would reduce apprehension that even the most shy
students may have," "helpful in my understanding of myself to vo-
calize my internship experiences with others," "Perfect! Student fa-
cilitation is an excellent way to promote discussion and interest-it
produces the ideal learning environment."
Needless to say, many students are initially skeptical. 144 Some vis-
ibly react to the term "feminist" when I describe my teaching
method the first day of class. 145 Others may feel discussion of their
own experiences, values and thoughts irrelevant compared with the
143. See supra note 139.
144. Students do not come to the first class with the skills of self-directed learn-
ing. Upon realizing that they must participate in the planning and direction of the
class, they can be skeptical as well as resentful. See MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, TaIP MOD-
ERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION 40 (1970) (describing the reorientation to self-
directed learning that adults must experience).
145. "Feminism is a dirty word." Bender, supra note 15, at 3.
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doctrinal theory they are used to learning. ' 8 They have been trained
to adhere to the words of their professors or supervising attorneys,
not their peers. They are unsure of their abilities to lead class dis-
cussions, and some wonder whether the professor is simply shirking
her duties.147
At times I, too, have had hesitation about the format. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to relinquish control completely. Although I
have adjusted to simply "appearing" in the classroom, I still find it
taxing to refrain from my ingrained role of directing discussions to
levels I think are more intellectual or appropriate. 148 I must con-
stantly remind myself that the class methodology is based upon the
concept that the process of learning is just as important as the con-
tent. I also find it difficult to be self-disclosing to students whom I
have not previously considered to be my peers. The class format re-
quires me to trust the students' abilities and to learn from their ex-
periences rather than tell them what to do-a format seemingly in-
apposite to my status as a professional educator.
C. Why It Works
I have described theories of self-learning and feminist pedagogy,
as well as my own experiences combining and applying the two theo-
ries in a law school field placement class. To accord with feminist
and self-learning theories, we must further build the theories de-
scribed in light of the teaching experience in order to better under-
stand why feminist pedagogy complements field placement classes.
Feminists and advocates of self-learning contend that theory is gen-
erated from personal experience, and that theories conceived must
be re-tested in light of new experiences.
Essentially, both the content and format of feminist methodology
and self-learning are substantially similar. The content of contextual
reasoning and perpetual questioning are institutional hallmarks of
146. For another discussion of this problem, see Paul Brest, On My Teaching, 10,
13-14 in SYmposIum Hu~himrSTIc EDUCATION IN THE LAW, supra note 104.
147. Students made these comments to me privately in the first few weeks of
class.
148. One way I have voiced my concern with the direction of a discussion is to
raise my hand and, when called upon, simply express my discomfort with the topic
and explain why I feel the way I do. An example of this is the class's discussion of
certain law school regulations. I was uncomfortable because, as a law school professor,
I felt the discussion was directed toward me instead of involving me, making me feel
like an outsider. Second, I felt that the topic was one more appropriately discussed in
other forums. When I expressed this to the class, the facilitator heard from two other
students on the issue, then redirected the discussion. Although her action no doubt
was based in part on my disapproval, I also sensed that, had anyone else objected, the
facilitator would have been sensitive to that person's discomfort, too. I also hoped
that by expressing my own dis-ease with the topic, I would encourage others to do so
when they also felt uncomfortable. For a description of professorial need to "deepen
down" a class discussion, see Pickard, supra note 97, at 294.
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both feminist and field placement teaching. In both field placement
programs and feminist teaching, abstract theories of law are re-
placed with personal and professional theories drawn from real-life
experiences-by clinical students from their lawyering experience
and by feminist students from their experiences as women. Both
movements encourage students to question continually and test
their formulated theories against their experiences and those of
others. Students are inspired to question and challenge the existing
norm-whether it be the legal system or the male hegemony.
But it is critical to fuse the content with the process. 149 In order to
encourage self-learning through contextual reasoning and question-
ing, it is logical that the format of the field placement class incorpo-
rate certain feminist principles of collaboration, shared leadership,
rejection of artificial dichotomies and consensus decision-making. A
classroom atmosphere that fuses content with process permits self-
learning in an environment safe from professorial judgment and
peer competition. Student facilitation in field placement classes re-
inforces the program goal of students taking personal responsibility
for their education. It also helps students who do not function well
under the Socratic system by allowing them a leadership role within
a supportive environment. Formats involving collaboration and con-
sensus allow students to develop skills in appropriate role behavior
for lawyers. 150 The feminist format of our field placement class also
complements the journal and private meeting requirements of the
internship. Class discussions give students more to write about in
their daily journals. We encourage them not only to write about
their own experiences, but also to compare their fieldwork and
thoughts on lawyering to those expressed by others in the class. In
return, journal writings encourage deeper levels of class discussion
by further engaging students in the practice of reflecting upon their
work experiences. Having already thought through an issue in their
journals, students frequently raise the same issue in class for feed-
back from their peers. In private meetings with supervising clinic
faculty, students discuss their learning in the context of what they
hear others learning in the class. They are more forthright concern-
149. See Nancy Schniedewind, Feminist Values: Guidelines for a Teaching
Methodology in Women's Studies, in LEARNING OUR WAY, 261-62 (Charlotte Bunch
& Sandra Pollack eds., 1983). "The more classroom interaction reflects feminist prin-
ciples and the greater the congruence between process and content, the more consis-
tent and powerful students' learning can be." Id. at 261.
150. Disparaging the more traditional model of the student/teacher hierarchy,
Professor Pickard writes:
[L]egal education fosters a view of professional behaviour towards clients
which is based on the experienced and accepted view of teacher behaviour
towards students .... [T]his model is hierarchical and inappropriate to
many legal (and educational) tasks.
Supra note 97, at 290.
[Vol. 45:19
FEMINIST CLINICAL GOALS
ing their own moral dilemmas of role identity, recognizing from class
discussion that their peers are encountering similar issues and that
it is safe to talk about one's values.
15 1
The content and format of feminist pedagogy are particularly
complementary to field placement programs, as opposed to in-house
or simulation clinics. Two reasons for this are that field placement
programs provide a broader context for students' experiences and do
not have to focus on the learning of technical skills in the classroom.
Students in most field placement programs are engaged in a wide
range of lawyering experiences with their supervising attorney,
rather than being involved primarily in the specifics of a particular
trial or skill, as students in an in-house or simulation clinic might
be. At California Western, as in many other field placement pro-
grams, students are in both public and private, as well as civil and
criminal, placements. As a result, the personal experiences narrated
in class provide a broader context for theorizing through conscious-
ness-raising than those of other clinical programs. Field placement
classes that emphasize self-learning also have the luxury of devoting
more time to personal issues of lawyering, thus according with femi-
nist pedagogy in providing a personal context for developing theory.
Students in our internship seminar frequently raise issues, such as
the quality of lawyers' lives, alleviating stress, and resolving conflicts
between personal and professional codes. Although in-house and
simulation classes may also discuss these topics, they usually have
important agendas emphasizing the learning of technical skills in
the classroom, as well.""' Also, because there is a more flexible
agenda in field placement classes, questioning of institutional norms
is more of a focus than it might be in other clinical programs.""
Emphasis in field placement programs is on challenging normative
values within the legal system, rather than critiquing an individual's
technique in a specific lawyering skill.' 54
151. See Brest, supra note 146, at 12.
A sense of trust and acceptance by others-and the concomitant sense of
community-is a good in itself. It also facilitates a full and honest discus-
sion of many of the difficult issues we encounter. It allows us to let down
defenses, which is often a precondition for examining the values we hold
and the choices we make.
Id. at 12.
152. Professor Goldfarb warns clinicians of becoming overly mired in technical
skills or on the unique demands of particular cases. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1675.
153. Professor Goldfarb also indicates that feminists may be more critical than
clinicians of institutional norms. Id. at 1672-73. Professor Goldfarb's comparisons be-
tween feminist and clinical theories, however, are more descriptive of in-house and
simulation ideologies than they are of field placement programs.
154. For further discussion of the "pre-designed" and "teacher-directed" nature
of in-house and simulation clinics, see Maher, supra note 8, at 564 n.86. For a discus-
sion of the control exerted by in-house and simulation clinicians, see Condlin, supra
note 13.
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Scholars have advocated in theory the combining of self-learning
with the collaborative classroom in the context of general educa-
tion' 55 or clinical legal education. 156 In her recommendation of an
appropriate fusion of feminist and clinical thinking, Professor Gold-
farb forecasts most precisely what our internship seminar does:
The feminist and clinical movements view the nature of justice and
community as the stakes of education, a sensibility that the class-
room can actively tap. To stimulate this sensibility, feminists and
clinicians would reduce the traditional hierarchy of the classroom.
A teacher wedded to this aim would not be the omniscient fount of
knowledge, but would facilitate the students' active responsibility
for making sense of their experience of the legal and interdiscipli-
nary materials. Authoritarianism conflicts with the values of this
project and impedes its possibilities of success. An atmosphere of
open exploration, where students and teachers exchange their
views and insights on matters of deep and abiding interest, encour-
ages students to assume responsibility for developing the under-
standing of self and others that this classroom approach
requires. 15
VII. CONCLUSION
Using a feminist pedagogy in our field placement class has awak-
ened me to the benefits of a more collaborative classroom. I have
learned that students are able to facilitate discussions on subjects of
great educational value which may never have occurred to me. I
have learned to trust students' abilities to deal with conflict on their
own. The class format has further enhanced my belief in the value
of learning from students' experiences, despite the risks of self-dis-
closure and relinquishing control to the class.
One of the most enjoyable aspects of legal education for me is that
it is not static. It is hoped that the chronicles of our classroom com-
ponent will continue to reflect that aspect. Using feminist pedagogy
in the classroom may prove to have its shortcomings, just as Lang-
dell's method has. But ultimately, the process of reexamining our
educational goals and methodologies is as important as the content
we choose to teach. That we must maintain our awareness of the
need to unify our substance with our methodology is the lesson my
students have taught me.
155. See, e.g., KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION, supra note
144. Adult self-learning should be accomplished in an environment "which causes
adults to feel accepted, respected, and supported; in which there exists a spirit of
mutuality between teachers and students as joint inquirers." Id. at 41.
156. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 133. Clinicians "could assert the positive value
of femininity over the negative masculinity of the classroom." Id. at 276.
157. Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 1695.
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